SHRINCS Advances as a Bitcoin Candidate for Post-Quantum Digital Signatures
Table of Contents
You might want to know
- What makes SHRINCS a potential post-quantum signature option for Bitcoin?
- How could its security safeguards affect wallet design, transaction capacity, and network fees?
Main Topic
Blockstream Research Director Jonas Nick and researcher Mikhail Kudinov, working with other contributors, have published a security analysis of SHRINCS, a proposal being explored as a post-quantum signature scheme for Bitcoin. The analysis accompanies an ongoing draft Bitcoin Improvement Proposal (BIP), and its authors are seeking feedback from engineers, cryptographers, protocol developers, and other members of the Bitcoin community. Kudinov has emphasized that the proposal should be scrutinized, tested, criticized, and improved through broad technical review.
SHRINCS is a hash-based signature scheme. It uses SHA-256, a cryptographic hash function already used throughout Bitcoin, as the foundation for its security. This approach reflects a relatively conservative design goal: build on a familiar, established primitive rather than depend on a new or less-tested cryptographic assumption. Using a known hash function does not by itself guarantee that an entire signature system is secure, however. The complete construction, its implementation, and the way wallets manage it all require careful analysis.
The proposal offers two spending paths, described as stateful and stateless. The stateful path is intended to be compact and efficient, helping limit the additional data required for transactions. The stateless path is larger and more expensive in transaction space, but it avoids some of the implementation risks associated with maintaining one-time key state. This pairing is central to SHRINCS’ design: a more space-efficient option is available, while a fallback is intended for cases in which safe state management cannot be assured.
Stateful signatures introduce a particular operational responsibility. They rely on one-time keys that can safely sign only a single transaction. A wallet must therefore keep accurate records of which keys and states have already been used. If a one-time state is reused accidentally, an attacker may be able to forge a signature for the associated address and take its funds. This is not merely a theoretical concern about cryptographic mathematics; it is also a risk created by software behavior, recovery procedures, synchronization, and user mistakes.
Nick has argued that wallet users should not be left to manage this hazard themselves. In comments to Head of MARA Foundation Isabel Foxen Duke on MARA Foundation TV, he said that users should be unable to act in a way that triggers the catastrophic failure, and that wallet developers must handle the stateful component correctly. In practical terms, that places a significant burden on wallet specifications and implementations: they must track state reliably and make safe choices even when the application encounters uncertainty.
For that reason, a key safety measure under discussion is automatic fallback to the stateless path whenever a wallet cannot confidently establish that a state counter remains uncompromised. The fallback should not depend on users recognizing a technical warning or making a difficult cryptographic decision. The central implementation principle is that uncertainty about one-time state should lead to a safe fallback, not to reuse of a potentially compromised state. Making this behavior dependable would require clear rules in the proposal as well as robust wallet engineering and testing.
The safer fallback has a network-level cost. Stateless signatures are substantially larger than stateful signatures, and larger signatures consume more block space. If many users choose the stateless option, or if wallets use it frequently because state cannot be preserved safely, fewer transactions may fit into each block. That could influence transaction fees and reduce the number of people able to transact within a given block capacity. Nick has cautioned that these effects could influence Bitcoin’s broader value proposition, although their scale would depend on future usage and fee-market conditions.
The size figures in the analysis illustrate the difference. Bitcoin’s current ECDSA signatures are typically 71 bytes long, while Taproot Schnorr signatures are 64 bytes. SHRINCS stateful signatures range from 548 to 4,619 bytes, and stateless signatures are 5,777 bytes. These figures show why the proposal’s security and efficiency choices cannot be considered separately: even the smaller SHRINCS option is larger than the existing signature examples, while the stateless path is larger still.
Those measurements do not determine future fees on their own. Fees depend on network demand, block-space availability, transaction composition, and the way the proposal might be used if adopted. A change in signature size could affect how many transactions fit into a block, but the actual economic impact would emerge from real-world patterns of use. Nick noted that researchers do not yet know what the fee market would look like with these larger signatures. The analysis therefore identifies an important question rather than offering a settled forecast.
Work on SHRINCS is continuing, and the design is being refined by a working group that includes researchers supported by nonprofits such as Brink and OpenSats. Nick also noted that AI-based research has helped accelerate optimization work on both signature paths. Such assistance may help researchers explore design alternatives, but optimization must be weighed against security, implementation complexity, and compatibility. A smaller or faster construction is useful only if its safety properties remain clear and verifiable.
The proposal’s progress will consequently depend on more than a favorable cryptographic assessment. The specification must explain the state model and fallback behavior unambiguously; wallet developers must implement those rules consistently; and reviewers must examine whether edge cases, recovery scenarios, or software failures could cause unsafe reuse. At the same time, network participants will need to consider the transaction-size implications and assess whether the resulting trade-offs are acceptable for Bitcoin.
The researchers are requesting review of both the proposal and its security analysis. Community feedback can help identify problems that are easy to miss within a small group, test assumptions against realistic wallet behavior, and clarify how the design would interact with Bitcoin’s existing systems. The broader ecosystem’s willingness to adopt SHRINCS will depend in part on whether its participants consider the balance between post-quantum security, operational safety, and block-space efficiency acceptable.
Key Insights Table
| Aspect | Description |
|---|---|
| Proposal and review | Blockstream researchers Jonas Nick and Mikhail Kudinov have published a security analysis and are seeking feedback on SHRINCS and its draft Bitcoin Improvement Proposal. |
| Cryptographic foundation | SHRINCS is hash-based and uses SHA-256, a primitive already used by Bitcoin, with the aim of relying on established cryptographic foundations. |
| Two spending paths | The stateful path is more compact but requires careful tracking of one-time keys. The larger stateless path avoids some state-management risks. |
| State-reuse risk | Reusing a one-time state can create a critical vulnerability that may allow an attacker to forge a signature and steal funds. |
| Signature sizes | Existing ECDSA signatures are typically 71 bytes and Taproot Schnorr signatures are 64 bytes. SHRINCS stateful signatures range from 548 to 4,619 bytes, while stateless signatures are 5,777 bytes. |
| Network trade-off | Larger signatures may reduce the number of transactions that fit in a block and could affect fees, though the future impact depends on network conditions and actual use. |
| Next steps | Further specification work, wallet testing, cryptographic review, and feedback from Bitcoin stakeholders will help determine whether SHRINCS is suitable for adoption. |
Afterwards...
SHRINCS highlights a broader challenge facing systems that may need to prepare for advances in quantum computing: a cryptographic design must be secure in theory and dependable in everyday use. Future research should continue examining hash-based signatures, the practical limits of stateful key management, and methods for making safe fallback behavior automatic. Independent analysis and realistic testing across wallet software, recovery procedures, and transaction workflows will be important parts of that effort.
Researchers and protocol developers should also study how larger signatures could interact with block capacity, fee markets, and access to transactions under different patterns of network demand. Better modeling may help stakeholders understand possible outcomes without treating uncertain projections as established facts. Equally important is clear communication: wallet users should not need specialist cryptographic knowledge to avoid a dangerous state-management error.
The next phase will depend on careful collaboration between cryptographers, wallet engineers, protocol contributors, and Bitcoin users. Continued review can clarify whether SHRINCS’ safety mechanisms are robust, whether its space costs can be reduced without weakening its design, and how its trade-offs compare with other post-quantum approaches. The objective is not simply to introduce a new signature scheme, but to develop a system whose security, usability, and network effects can be understood before broad adoption.
Last edited at:2026/11/20
