Why Ukraine Depends on Starlink and Whether Europe Can Build an Alternative

Table of Contents

• You might want to know
• Why Ukraine relies on Starlink—and Europe’s alternatives
• Key Insights Table
• Afterwards...

You might want to know

• What makes Starlink so difficult to replace on Ukraine’s battlefield?
• Can European satellite networks provide Ukraine with secure, reliable connectivity in the near future?

Why Ukraine relies on Starlink—and Europe’s alternatives

Ukraine’s dependence on Starlink has become a pressing security concern. A sudden slowdown of the service in Ukraine last week, which affected Kyiv’s ability to defend itself against Russian attacks, demonstrated how much the country’s communications rely on a network controlled by a private company in the United States. The incident has also intensified calls in Europe for a military-grade satellite system that European governments can depend on directly.

For Ukrainian forces, stable connectivity is not simply a matter of convenience. Soldiers use satellite internet to communicate, exchange information, and coordinate activity across the battlefield. Several troops who spoke anonymously to the BBC described reliable access as a matter of life and death. One warned that a complete shutdown would be “an absolute catastrophe,” adding that cost would be secondary when lives were at stake. Their comments convey the practical consequences of a communications outage in a conflict where decisions and information must move quickly.

Starlink’s particular value comes from its combination of speed, coverage, and portability. Ukraine uses Starlink for battlefield communications and Starshield, its military-grade counterpart, for military applications including drone warfare. Fast, real-time connectivity can help forces share information and respond to attacks. Vincent Tourret, a researcher at the French Institute of International Relations, said drone warfare cannot be conducted without this kind of high-speed internet connection. A Ukrainian soldier told the BBC that the ability to pass commands and transfer data even one or two seconds faster can create a tangible advantage on the battlefield.

The terminals used to connect to satellites matter as much as the satellites themselves. Starlink terminals are comparatively small and lightweight, making them suitable for installation on different vehicles and drones. Eutelsat’s terminals, by contrast, are somewhat larger. Former Eutelsat chief executive Eva Berneke said they can be installed on a car roof or on tanks, but may not fit on smaller drones. She also said they are about five times more expensive. These differences affect whether a system can be adopted quickly and used across varied military equipment.

Starlink’s scale is another major obstacle to replacing it. It is the world’s largest satellite constellation, with 10,000-plus satellites. France’s Eutelsat, through its OneWeb service, is the principal European alternative, but it has about 600 active satellites. The disparity does not, by itself, determine how useful a network may be: satellite design, orbit, coverage, terminals, and the services a system is permitted to provide all matter. Still, it highlights why an existing alternative cannot simply be assumed to match Starlink’s capacity and flexibility.

The risks became more visible amid a public dispute over whether Starlink could be used for military operations. On Saturday, Elon Musk accused Ukraine of breaching Starlink’s terms of service by using the network for “drone strikes to kill people.” He said the loophole had been closed last week and wrote on X that violating the terms would lead to the end of service. He also claimed that if Starlink were switched off, the Ukrainian front line would collapse immediately. The exact authority behind the restrictions remains unclear, with responsibility disputed among the Pentagon, Donald Trump, and Musk.

Starlink and Starshield are both owned by Musk’s SpaceX and have played a prominent role in the global satellite market for years. Their importance gives Ukraine a powerful capability, but it also leaves the country dependent on a service it does not control. Kari Bingen, director of the Aerospace Security Project at CSIS, described this as the “flipside” of reliance on Starlink: the network is a critical military capability, yet Ukraine cannot make the final decisions about its availability. French MEP Christophe Grudler made a similar point on social media, arguing that Ukraine’s defence should not depend on the whims of Trump or Musk.

There are alternatives available now, but none is a complete substitute for Starlink’s military role. Ukraine’s most immediate prospect is Govsatcom, an EU satellite-sharing network established in January to make existing satellite capacity available among EU member states. Ukraine is not currently a full-fledged member, although it is seeking to join, and the European Commission is in discussions with Kyiv. Even if access were granted immediately, however, Govsatcom could not be used for warfare operations such as piloting drones—the kind of work for which Ukraine uses Starshield.

That limitation may ease by the start of next year, when the European Commission hopes commercial operators, including Eutelsat’s OneWeb, will participate in Govsatcom. Such participation could help meet some of Ukraine’s military connectivity requirements, but not all of them. Berneke said she was confident Eutelsat could support quite a lot of Ukraine’s key military needs. Meeting the country’s full communications requirements is a different challenge: those needs are varied and extensive. Eutelsat, while declining to comment specifically on Govsatcom, described itself as the only European operator with a fully operational Low Earth Orbit constellation and said it was committed to resilient connectivity for the businesses, governments, and communities it serves.

No date has been set for Ukraine to join Govsatcom. If it does, the network is likely to serve as a dependable backup rather than a full replacement for Starlink and Starshield. Tourret said that another way to stay connected would be valuable if Starlink were shut down, but added that, at this stage, it would not be enough for strikes or interceptions. This distinction is central: a backup that supports some communications can still fall short of the speed, coverage, and operational permissions needed for every battlefield task.

Europe’s longer-term answer is Iris², an ambitious satellite programme intended to rival Starlink and Starshield. The European Commission describes it as a defence-first system focused on governments, the military, and emergency services. Ukraine has been guaranteed access from day one. The project is part of the EU’s space programme and is being led by Eutelsat, SES, and Hispasat through a consortium called SpaceRISE. It is not expected to be operational until 2029.

Iris² is planned to include 348 satellites in low and medium Earth orbit, far fewer than Starlink’s current constellation. Bingen cautioned against treating that difference as proof that the European system will be inferior. Satellite coverage depends on a range of design choices, she explained, and satellites able to cover larger areas may mean fewer are needed. The number alone does not establish the system’s effectiveness. Tourret was more sceptical, describing Iris² as neither a gamechanger nor a great saviour. These contrasting assessments reflect uncertainty about how a planned network will perform in real military conditions.

Even when Iris² becomes available, Ukraine would have little reason to abandon other networks. Communications resilience depends on having multiple ways to stay connected if one system fails. Bingen compared this to mobile networks: if a phone cannot use 5G, it may fall back to 4G or 3G. Berneke also described the principle as having several networks available. In a war, however, degraded service is not merely an inconvenience. A slower connection might delay information or commands, and, as Berneke warned, that can be a deadly situation for a drone operator.

Other projects may add options over time. Finnish companies Nokia and ICEYE announced this week that they would examine the development of satellite communications for Ukraine’s military defences. A joint venture between European satellite manufacturers Airbus, Leonardo, and Thales, called Project Bromo, is also intended to compete with SpaceX, but remains at a very early stage. These proposals show growing interest in European capacity, but announcements and early development work should not be confused with an operational network ready for immediate use.

Building a satellite system takes years and requires substantial investment. Berneke said that designing a programme, manufacturing and launching satellites, and putting enough of them in orbit to provide full coverage is a long process. Even with €8bn available immediately, she said she did not think she could have a system in orbit before 2032-2033. That estimate illustrates why long-term European plans cannot solve Ukraine’s immediate exposure to disruption.

The strategic significance of satellite communications has grown because ground-based infrastructure can be attacked. Mobile networks and fibre connections are vulnerable to damage on the ground, whereas disabling an entire satellite network is much harder for a military to do at present, Berneke said. Space-based systems are therefore an important part of modern defence, even though they are not invulnerable and cannot eliminate dependence on other communications infrastructure.

Satellite links are also only one part of the global communications picture. About 99% of the world’s communications travel through undersea cables. Those cables can be vulnerable to attack, and the UK government outlined new measures this week to protect them following an increase in suspicious activity by Russian vessels. Bingen noted that in a crisis or conflict there are serious concerns that undersea cables could be cut, making satellite communication a useful backup. A resilient communications strategy therefore requires a combination of systems rather than reliance on any single technology.

Key Insights Table

Afterwards...

Europe has recognised that security depends in part on reliable access to space-based communications. But Ukraine’s immediate problem is not solved by a future constellation or a programme still under development. Govsatcom may provide a useful safety net, while Iris² and other European projects could broaden the available options in the coming years. Their practical value will depend on coverage, speed, terminal design, military permissions, and how quickly capacity becomes available.

The likely direction is not a complete switch from Starlink to a single European replacement, but a more resilient mix of networks. Multiple providers and technologies can reduce the risk that one company’s decision, technical failure, or political dispute disrupts essential communications. For Ukraine, that redundancy matters most when a connection must support real-time military operations. Europe’s challenge is to turn its growing urgency into dependable capability while recognising that building and deploying satellite infrastructure takes time.