How Xi Argues the U.S. and China Can Avoid the Thucydides Trap

Preface

Context:

During a high-profile state visit to the United States, Chinese President Xi Jinping reiterated a familiar but consequential argument: the rising tension between China and the United States does not have to end in armed conflict. By invoking the academic notion known as the Thucydides Trap, Xi framed the bilateral relationship as one where competition can proceed without confrontation. This article summarizes Xi's reasoning, traces the idea’s intellectual roots, and explains why Chinese leaders present this framing as both a caution and a policy guide. The purpose is to clarify what Xi meant by saying the Thucydides Trap "can be overcome," how that aligns with his broader foreign policy messaging, and what practical steps he proposes to reduce the risk of escalation between the two powers.

Lazy bag

Key takeaway: Xi argues the U.S. and China can manage rivalry without war by emphasizing crisis communication, mutual restraint, and institutional mechanisms to prevent military clashes. He borrowed the "Thucydides Trap" language popularized by a Harvard scholar but stresses that suspicion, not inevitability, drives dangerous outcomes. The message seeks to reassure both domestic and international audiences that competition can remain peaceful.

Main Body

Chinese President Xi Jinping used his recent state visit to the United States to underscore a central theme of his external strategy: major-power competition should not automatically devolve into conflict. Arriving at the White House, Xi declared that the "Thucydides Trap can be overcome," signaling confidence that rivalry between Beijing and Washington can be managed through political will and practical measures. The Thucydides Trap — a phrase brought into modern strategic conversation chiefly by Harvard scholar Graham Allison — describes a historical pattern in which the rapid rise of one state alarms an established power and makes war likely. Xi’s adoption of the term demonstrates both his engagement with contemporary strategic ideas and his intent to shape how that idea is interpreted as policy.

The phrase’s intellectual provenance matters. Graham Allison popularized the concept in the 2010s, drawing on Thucydides’ account of the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta. The historical analogy warns that rising-power dynamics can produce fear, miscalculation, and ultimately armed conflict. Allison’s work has been influential among policymakers and academics globally; he has visited China multiple times and engaged with Chinese institutions, which likely made the concept more familiar to Chinese leaders. Xi himself referenced the Thucydides Trap in earlier interviews, framing it as a strategic hazard that requires active management.

Xi’s recent public remarks contrasted two ways of viewing the Thucydides Trap. At a prior summit, he posed the question of whether the two countries could avoid the trap; on this state visit he asserted they can indeed overcome it. That shift — from asking to asserting — reflects a deliberate rhetorical move: to replace fatalism with agency. For Xi, the danger is not an immutable law of history but a product of distrust, misperception, and poor crisis management. By emphasizing these proximate causes, he opens space for institutional remedies: better military-to-military channels, clearer communications, and shared norms to prevent accidental escalation.

Practically, Xi framed the relationship as one in which the two powers should pursue "healthy" competition rather than zero-sum confrontation. He used a vivid metaphor, suggesting the relationship should be "a race of catching up with one another, not a wrestle in which one either wins or loses." That language underscores a preference for economic, technological, and diplomatic rivalry contained within agreed-upon boundaries. Xi also urged improvements in crisis communication and prevention between the militaries of both countries, signaling that reducing the risk of inadvertent clashes at sea or in the air is a top priority.

Observers in China interpreted these statements as a definition of a new bilateral bottom line: intense competition is acceptable, but military conflict must be avoided. Chinese scholars and commentators suggested the summit’s most important political outcome was establishing this boundary, which they argue injects stability into an otherwise volatile relationship. For Beijing, this framing serves multiple audiences: it reassures a global public worried about great-power war, comforts domestic constituencies that expect assertive defense of national interests, and communicates to Washington a clear preference for institutional dispute management over battlefield confrontation.

On the U.S. side, public comments during the visit emphasized cooperation in general terms, though certain sensitive topics — such as Taiwan — received limited public attention in summit statements. According to the Chinese readout, Xi called on the United States to oppose "Taiwan independence," a long-standing Beijing red line. The absence of an extensive public U.S. response on that point during the visit illustrates the delicate balancing act Washington faces: signaling support for partners while avoiding steps that Beijing regards as provocative. That delicate balance is precisely the kind of tension Xi’s Thucydides Trap language seeks to manage through clearer channels and mutual restraint.

Ultimately, Xi’s argument that the Thucydides Trap can be overcome rests on three linked premises. First, historical patterns do not determine the future; choices by leaders matter. Second, mistrust, misperception, and weak crisis-management institutions are the proximate drivers of conflict, not the mere fact of changing power distribution. Third, building robust means of communication and mutual reassurance can lower the risk of inadvertent escalation. These premises translate into policy prescriptions — from establishing military hotlines and engagement protocols to pursuing limited agreements that reduce the scope for dangerous misunderstandings.

Whether this framing will prove durable depends on how both sides act after the photo ops and joint statements. Rhetoric about overcoming historical traps must be matched by investments in the institutions and habits of cooperation that make peaceful rivalry credible. In the absence of such follow-through, even well-intentioned declarations risk becoming temporary rhetorical devices. If, however, the two governments translate Xi’s message into sustained crisis-management practices and clearer strategic signals, they may reduce the likelihood that a rise in tensions will spiral into the kind of violent confrontation that the Thucydides Trap warns against.

Conclusion:

Xi’s public embrace of the language that the Thucydides Trap can be overcome is both a strategic narrative and a policy call. It reframes great-power rivalry as manageable rather than inevitable, emphasizes the role of trust-building and communication, and sets a practical boundary: compete hard, but do not fight. The real test will be whether both capitals convert the concept into concrete mechanisms that make peaceful competition more reliable.

Key Insights Table