U.S. Treasury Sanctions Two Crypto Exchanges Accused of Laundering Millions for Iran’s Military
Table of Contents
You might want to know
Which crypto platforms did the U.S. Treasury designate for allegedly laundering funds tied to Iran’s military?
What actions and incentives has the U.S. government introduced to disrupt Iran’s use of digital assets and shadow-banking networks?
Main Topic
On August 7, the U.S. Department of the Treasury announced sanctions on two cryptocurrency exchanges it says were involved in moving millions of dollars on behalf of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and other Iran-linked entities. The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) added the platforms to the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List, which effectively severs them from access to U.S. financial systems and freezes any property in U.S. jurisdiction.
The Treasury identified the first exchange as Shelbit Exchange, linked to a broader network run by an individual named Siavash Kayvanpour. Kayvanpour, an Iran-born operator who holds Dominica and Afghanistan citizenship, is accused of running a multi-country operation out of the UAE and Georgia. Through Shelbit and affiliated companies, the Treasury alleges that Iran-linked wallets sent more than $1 million in cryptocurrency to Shelbit, while Shelbit forwarded in excess of $2 million back to Iranian wallets. Additional transfers reportedly included several million dollars routed to Nobitex, an Iranian exchange previously sanctioned for connections to terrorist financing.
This key insight significantly impacts the understanding of how state-linked actors may exploit cross-border crypto platforms and shadow-banking channels to move funds despite sanctions. Treasury statements also assert that Shelbit facilitated the laundering of tens of millions of dollars from an online Persian-language gambling network, broadening the scope of alleged illicit activity beyond state-directed transfers.
The second platform named in the designations, Aban Tether, is accused of processing millions in transactions with several already-designated Iranian exchanges, including Nobitex, Wallex, Bitpin, and Ramzinex. According to the Treasury, both Shelbit and Aban Tether were designated under authorities targeting Iran’s financial sector and its support for terrorism. By placing these entities on the SDN List, the U.S. government seeks to cut off any direct U.S. interactions and to deter third-country firms from maintaining ties under the threat of secondary sanctions.
Regulatory and enforcement developments in multiple jurisdictions intersect with these allegations. The UAE’s Virtual Assets Regulatory Authority (VARA) previously took enforcement actions against Shelbit General Trading in January 2025 and again in July 2026, but Treasury reports indicate the exchange continued operating until the U.S. action. In addition to Shelbit Exchange, associated companies — including Shelbit Technologies (Poland) and UAE-based Crypto Home and NFT Home DMCC — were designated alongside the operator and the exchange.
U.S. officials framed these moves as part of a broader campaign to disrupt Iran’s access to financial resources via digital assets and informal banking networks. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent described the steps as evidence the campaign — referenced by the Treasury as “Economic Fury” — is constraining the Iranian regime’s ability to rely on crypto and shadow-banking channels. The Treasury emphasized that it will continue to pursue illicit finance in fiat and digital forms.
Complementing the Treasury’s sanctions, the State Department’s Rewards for Justice program announced a financial incentive of up to $15 million for information that helps dismantle the IRGC’s financial mechanisms. The U.S. government has also publicized prior crypto seizure activity: in May, authorities reported freezing $131 million in Iran-linked crypto assets, and Treasury officials have stated that roughly $1 billion in Iranian crypto has been seized since the campaign’s inception.
With the new designations effective as of August 7, the assets of Shelbit Exchange, Aban Tether, and the listed individuals that touch the U.S. financial system are blocked. Any U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging with SDN-listed entities, and non-U.S. firms that continue business with them may face secondary sanctions or restricted access to U.S. markets. The combined measures reflect a coordinated approach using sanctions, public designation, and rewards to reduce Iran’s financial maneuverability in digital asset markets.
These events underscore the evolving enforcement landscape for virtual asset service providers and the heightened scrutiny on cross-border operators that serve as potential conduits for sanctioned actors. The case also demonstrates the interplay between domestic regulatory steps in jurisdictions like the UAE and extraterritorial pressure applied via U.S. sanctions policy, highlighting both the potential and the limits of national measures when illicit finance spans multiple legal systems.
Key Insights Table
| Aspect | Description |
|---|---|
| Designated Entities | Shelbit Exchange and Aban Tether were added to the SDN List for allegedly moving funds linked to Iran’s IRGC and other sanctioned platforms. |
| Principal Operator | Siavash Kayvanpour is named as a central figure operating a multi-country network from the UAE and Georgia, with affiliated firms in Poland and the UAE. |
| Alleged Flows | Iran-linked wallets reportedly sent over $1 million to Shelbit, which sent more than $2 million back and forwarded additional funds to other sanctioned Iranian exchanges. |
| Enforcement Context | Designations are part of the U.S. "Economic Fury" campaign; VARA had previously taken enforcement actions against related entities in the UAE. |
| U.S. Incentives | The State Department offers up to $15 million for intelligence disrupting IRGC financial networks; prior U.S. crypto freezes include $131 million seized in May. |
Afterwards...
Looking forward, this episode highlights several areas where technology, regulation, and international cooperation deserve further attention. First, enhanced cross-border regulatory coordination is critical: digital asset enforcement often requires timely data sharing between jurisdictions to trace complex transaction chains. Improving standardized information exchange protocols would make it more difficult for illicit networks to exploit regulatory gaps.
Second, investment in blockchain analytics and forensics can sharpen authorities’ ability to identify and attribute suspicious flows while preserving legitimate privacy and innovation. Combining on-chain analysis with traditional financial intelligence and open-source research strengthens investigative reach.
Third, continued development of compliance standards for virtual asset service providers — including rigorous know-your-customer (KYC) practices and enhanced due diligence for cross-border counterparts — will reduce the chance that platforms become unwitting facilitators of illicit finance. Finally, policy approaches that balance effective enforcement with clear, predictable rules for market participants will help legitimate crypto businesses operate safely and transparently without undermining financial innovation.
Collectively, these priorities can make it more difficult for state-linked and criminal actors to use digital assets as a workaround for sanctions, while allowing regulators and industry to support lawful uses of emerging financial technology.