Finals Film Study: How Victor Wembanyama Dominated the Rim and Opened the Spurs’ Offense
Table of Contents
You might want to know
• How did Victor Wembanyama get more effective at finishing at the rim in Game 3?
• What tactical adjustments did the San Antonio Spurs make to reduce opposing “tags” and create better spacing?
Main Topic
In Game 3 at Madison Square Garden, Victor Wembanyama posted 32 points, eight rebounds, six assists, two steals and three blocks while the San Antonio Spurs produced their most efficient offensive outing of the Finals to date. Much of that improvement stemmed from clearer lanes to the rim for Wembanyama after ball-screens. Over the course of the series, opposing defenses had prioritized preventing uncontested rolls to the basket, but in this contest the Spurs changed spacing and alignment enough times to reduce those defensive ‘‘tags’’ and create cleaner opportunities.
Through the first two games, the Knicks had frequently used a nearby defender to confront Wembanyama as he rolled after screening—often a guard like Jalen Brunson who would step in and impede the big man’s path. That tactic proved effective early because it required limited rotation distance and forced Wembanyama into contested finishes or kick-outs. In Game 3, San Antonio deliberately modified where its perimeter players positioned themselves on the weak side to limit the Knicks’ ability to tag the roller.
With alternate spacing, the Spurs sometimes placed two players on the strong side and only one on the weak side, or positioned the weak-side player deeply in the corner. Those adjustments meant the Knicks had to choose between leaving a shooter open or sending a nearby defender to impede Wembanyama’s roll. On multiple possessions, the Knicks could not execute an effective tag: either there was no defender close enough to body up Wembanyama, or the help arrived late and badly aligned. The result: Wembanyama converted more at the rim (7-for-9 on attempts at the rim) and from the free-throw line (8-for-9), producing 22 of his 32 points on those high-value actions.
This key insight significantly impacts the understanding of how small spacing adjustments can transform a pick-and-roll threat into a central offensive conduit. By forcing the defense to decide—surrender corner shooters or send help—San Antonio created repeated advantages that opened driving lanes or produced easy kick-outs for open threes.
Game-film examples highlight the sequence late in the second quarter when the Spurs placed Julian Champagnie in the left corner and Dylan Harper in the left baseline ‘‘dunker’’ spot, leaving Devin Vassell isolated far on the opposite wing. When Wembanyama screened for De’Aaron Fox, the Knicks lacked a nearby weak-side tag. Jordan Clarkson and Josh Hart converged after Wembanyama caught the ball, but the scramble allowed a pass to Champagnie, who attacked and then reversed the ball to Wembanyama for a relocation three. On the subsequent possession the same look produced an alley-oop finish when Wembanyama sealed his man and rolled unchecked to the rim. These repeats show both planning and recognition by the Spurs coaching staff and players.
Beyond pure finishes, the spacing tweaks created downstream benefits. With defenses forced to collapse more often, the Spurs found more wide-open perimeter attempts: 20 of their 34 three-point attempts in Game 3 were classified as wide open (59%), up from 43% across the first two games. Although San Antonio didn’t make many of those open threes (6-for-20 on those attempts), the threat of the kick-out constrained how aggressively the defense could commit to stopping Wembanyama, thereby sustaining rim opportunities and free-throw attempts.
Wembanyama’s influence extended to playmaking and draw-and-kick actions. Several possessions show him sealing a switch or creating a mismatch after the screen, then finding shooters when help arrived. On others, his roll drew two defenders and created open catch-and-shot opportunities for perimeter teammates. The combination of finishing, drawing fouls, and facilitating increased the Spurs’ points per possession dramatically in Game 3—an efficiency spike that aligned with Wembanyama’s improved rim work.
Finally, these adjustments were not one-offs. Wembanyama set 35 ball-screens in the game—his third-highest total in 19 playoff appearances—demonstrating how central the pick-and-roll has become to San Antonio’s offense. The deliberate variance in weak- and strong-side spacing forced the Knicks into difficult choices and produced repeatable results. If the Spurs sustain this approach and Wembanyama continues to get cleaner rolls, the offense will remain dangerous: teams must either contest the rim and concede shooters or tag the roller and risk open perimeter attempts.
Key Insights Table
| Aspect | Description |
|---|---|
| Wembanyama Production | 32 points, 8 rebounds, 6 assists, 3 blocks; 22 points at the rim or free-throw line. |
| Rim Efficiency | 7-for-9 on rim attempts and 8-for-9 at the free-throw line, showing cleaner finishes from roll actions. |
| Ball-screen Usage | 35 screens used by Wembanyama; varied weak/strong-side spacing to limit ‘‘tags.’" |
| Spacing Outcome | 59% of three attempts were wide open (20/34), up from 43% through first two games. |
| Team Efficiency | Spurs scored 115 points on 93 possessions (123.7 per 100), their most efficient game since a Western Conference semifinals clincher. |
Afterwards...
Looking ahead, the tactical blueprint from Game 3 emphasizes two areas teams and analysts should continue to explore. First, the interplay between pick-and-roll alignment and weak-side spacing: small positional tweaks can dramatically change how a defense must allocate resources. Coaches can study how alternating one-versus-two weak-side looks forces choices that favor the offense.
Second, the scouting and preparation for elite roll threats requires both physical and schematic responses. Teams will need to decide whether to accept open perimeter shots, rotate earlier to tag the roller, or switch more frequently—each has trade-offs that can be modeled and tested. Continued film study, spacing analytics, and communication drills that improve help-timing will be valuable research areas for teams aiming to defend players like Wembanyama.
As the series moves forward, observing whether the Spurs can replicate these spacing variations and whether opponents adapt successfully will be key to anticipating future outcomes. The tactical lessons from Game 3 are clear: when a top rim threat receives cleaner rolls, the entire offense benefits, and the margin for defensive error narrows considerably.